For the proof of God, the following basic assumptions apply:

G1) The truth of a statement is determined by its conditions, axioms, and the rules governing their application within the system in which they are applied.

G2) If the logical structure of two systems is identical, then they share the same conditions, the same axioms, and the same rules of application.

G3) Therefore, if two systems are identical in their logical structure, then a statement that is true in one system must also be true in the other system.

Now the argument:

P1)
a.) A true statement in reality is also true in a simulation of reality.

... and conversely

b.) A true statement in the simulation of reality is also true in reality.

(Otherwise, it is not a simulation of reality = definition.)

P2) A human being who simulates reality is an intelligent creator of that simulation.

P3) Within this simulation, the statement

"The world was created by an intelligent creator"

is true.

C) The statement

"The world was created by an intelligent creator."

is therefore also true in our reality!

Known objections to the simulation argument:

***The simulation never fully reproduces reality.

P1 only requires coherence regarding the conditions that determine the truth value of a specific statement. A complete simulation

- is not necessary for a specific statement (such as the conclusion),
- and would not change its truth.

***How do we know that R and S are really logically identical ?

We create the simulation ourselves, so the rules that apply within it are the rules we define—in this case, our own. Therefore, the fact that the same logic applies inside the simulation as in our world is not an option but a definition.

***Which rules are being simulated ?

Those that logicians claim describe our world.
One cannot claim that the world can be described by rules while simultaneously claiming not to know those rules.

***The argument assumes what it is trying to prove.

The intelligent designer of S follows from our observation (P2/P3).
The intelligent designer of R follows from P1 (truth transfer).

***Infinite regress (a simulation within a simulation within a simulation, etc. / who created the simulator?)

The very confirmation of C in every S demands an explanation as to why C should suddenly no longer hold in R.

***Category mistake (A human being is not God)

The argument does not say: "Human = God."
The argument says: The statement *"The world was created by an intelligent creator."* is true in our reality !

***The problem of indexicality

Indexicality refers to expressions such as "I," "now," or "here," which cannot be understood unambiguously without knowing the speaker's situation and context.

The objection states:
"The world" has different referents; therefore, it has different conditions for φ, and therefore there is no identity that would justify identical truth values.

However, if "the world" can have different referents, then we also cannot know what is meant by "the world," "I," "you," "he," "she," "it," "here," or "now."

In that case, there never was such a thing as "logic."

Logic necessarily depends on unambiguous reference.
If the objection from indexicality is valid, then it is always valid—and then logic cannot make meaningful statements about "the world."

*** φ = "The world was created by an intelligent creator."
is a statement about the origin of R, not about its contents.
Therefore, S cannot make a statement about the origin of R.

This criticism confuses reality with a statement about reality (Q3).
The argument does not say that a creator really exists.
The argument says: The statement *"The world was created by an intelligent creator."* is true in our reality !

***Contingent statements: "I am currently in reality and not in a simulation."

Contingent means that the statement could be either true or false, but it is never necessarily true. Why not ?

1. It is neither verifiable nor falsifiable.

There is no objective criterion by which this statement can be verified.
And personal perception is not an objective criterion.

2. It is not necessarily true.

3. It is not logically true.

Therefore, contingent statements cannot serve as arguments.

***Bob created the world. (Contrary to our intuition)

If Bob creates S, then the statement "Bob created the world" is necessarily true in S—and therefore logically true for us.

However, to refute the argument, there must be a contradiction between the truth values of a statement in the different systems.

But there is none. An even more real Bob could have created the world, and we could be living in his simulation.

And even if Bob confirms that he is not the creator of the world, we cannot verify his statement.

***Who is the correct intelligent designer if there are two simulators ?
Bob creates S and Tom creates S.
Which statement from which S should we believe?

P1 claims identical truth values between R and S.
It does not claim identical truth values between different simulations.

What if Bob and Tom create S together?

Multiple intelligent designers are more of a luxury problem for the argument than a confirmation of atheism.

These are Claude's responses to criticism from Grok and Gemini.
The criticism attempts to introduce a special status for R.
These responses demonstrate the problems with that criticism.

P1: The Boolean data type "truth value" (T) has only two possible states: "true" or "false."

P2: Human beings assign the truth value T(φ) to the information φ based on their rules and knowledge.

P3: T can only be assigned to φ if its preconditions are known or at least theoretically assumed.

P4: A simulation (S) is defined as the reproduction of all preconditions relevant to T(φ).

P5: Because S contains the same preconditions, it always produces the same T(φ) for φ as reality (R). Anything else would be arbitrary.

P6: In this thought experiment, S contains a simulation of itself:
$S \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow Sn$

P7: If T(φ) is true in S, then T(φ) is also true in S_2, …, Sn.
Almost all critics accept this for sub-simulations.
The question is: Why not also for $R \rightarrow S$?

P8: This means that in every S, the information "This system has an external origin." has the truth value "true," because every simulation was created.

If the transfer of T(φ) works between any simulation levels, then it must also work between R and S—unless R is categorically different from all simulations.

Any argument against the transfer from S to R that does not also block the transfer from S_1 to S_2 is arbitrary special pleading.

After every criticism, ask directly:

1. "Does your objection also apply to $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$?
2. "If not, what makes $R \rightarrow S$ fundamentally different from $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$?"
3. "If yes, then simulations are impossible, and your objection is meaningless."

Grok claims that the transfer between S_1 and S_2 works because "the causal structure is explicitly defined."
But an avatar in S_1 possesses exactly the same information about its "explicit definition" as we possess about ours.

Grok argues that the transfer from S to R is blocked because we do not know whether R is a simulation.
But if "ontological uncertainty" is a valid obstacle, then it applies at every level.

The argument forces every critic into the same dilemma:
Either logical consistency (and therefore the conclusion that "This system has an external origin.") or the destruction of the entire concept of simulation.

The Equivocation Objection

Gemini claims that "this system" changes its meaning between S and R.
This is the classic objection from indexicality, but it overlooks the following:

In every simulation, the identical question arises. A thinking inhabitant of S asks: "Does this system (S_1) have an external origin?" exactly as we ask:
"Does this system (R) have an external origin ?"

The logical structure of the question is identical.
If the simulation truly reproduces all relevant preconditions (P4), then the process of reasoning must also be identical.

The Context Problem

Gemini argues that we cannot observe R "from the outside."
But an inhabitant of S_1 cannot observe S_1 "from the outside" either—he is just as "trapped" as we are.

The question is:
How does a simulated inhabitant know that his system has an external origin?
Only through logical reasoning based on the information available.
The same method is available to us.

The Indexicality Trap

Gemini treats "this system" as referring to different propositions in S and R. However, if the simulation is accurate (P5), then structurally identical statements must have identical truth values.

If φ is true in S because of the logical structure of the situation, then φ must also be true in R, provided that R has the same logical structure.

Gemini claims that R is "not an element of the chain" but rather "the context."

But this is an arbitrary assumption. How does Gemini know that R is not itself a link in a longer chain ($R_2 \rightarrow R_1 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow S_2 \ldots$) ?
He assumes precisely what he would have to prove: namely, that R occupies a fundamentally privileged position.

An inhabitant of S_1 could argue in exactly the same way: "S_1 is the context for S_2, S_3..., and therefore occupies a privileged position."
Gemini would rightly reject that argument.

The core of Gemini's problem:

Gemini introduces a categorical distinction between "simulation" and "reality" without justifying it. This distinction is:

1. not empirically justified (we have no "outside view" of R),
2. logically arbitrary (why should R occupy a privileged position ?),
3. self-contradictory (if simulations are truly accurate, there is no ontological difference).

Gemini now argues that the special treatment of R is "epistemologically necessary rather than arbitrary."

But this does not solve the problem—it merely shifts it.
Why should one's epistemological position be relevant to logical truth values?
If φ is true in S because of the logical structure of the situation, then this does not depend on who observes it or from which "perspective."

Gemini claims that we cannot "observe the level above us."

But that is irrelevant to the argument. An inhabitant of S_1 cannot observe that S_1 was created by R either. He can only infer it through logical reasoning—exactly as we do. Observation is not the point.

Gemini says: "For every observer, their own system is the ultimate reality."

But that is precisely the assumption your argument challenges.
If an inhabitant of S_1 can validly prove that S_1 was created (which Gemini accepts), then S_1 is not the "ultimate reality" for that inhabitant.

Gemini calls this "an invalid induction from the parts to the whole."

But your argument is not an induction—it is a deduction.
If R has the ability to create thinking beings in S,
and those beings can correctly conclude, "We are created,"
then we in R possess the same information and the same capacity for reasoning.

This is not an inductive inference but logical consistency.

Regarding the avatar objection:

Gemini argues that the avatar has different contextual information ("My context is system S"). But this is circular.
If the avatar and you possess identical information, then the avatar also knows that it is in a simulation—just as you know that you may be in a simulation.
The contextual information is part of the identical logical structure.

Regarding the information argument:

Gemini treats "System.Origin" as a variable with different values in S and R.
But this misses the point. If S and R are logically isomorphic, then they have the same truth values for the same statements.
The information "This system is created" is true in S—and by isomorphism, that information must also be true in R.

The error in Gemini's analysis:

Gemini treats indexicality as the problem but overlooks that logical isomorphism means that indexical expressions must refer to corresponding entities.
If "I" in S refers to the avatar … and "I" in R refers to you, and both systems are isomorphic, then both instances of "I" must have the same truth values for structural statements.

Gemini implicitly introduces an asymmetry. He treats S as "only a simulation" and R as "real reality." But this violates the assumption of isomorphism.
If the systems are truly isomorphic, there is no logical justification for such an asymmetry.

The "Context Trick"

Gemini argues that Info_S contains the datum "My context is system S" whereas Info_R contains the datum "My context is system R," and therefore the information is not actually identical.

Ultimately, this is a circular objection. Gemini assumes the conclusion (different contexts) and turns it into a premise (different information).
But this does not answer the fundamental question:
Why should the "context" make any difference at all?

If your avatar in S says, "I am created," and that statement is true because of its complete informational state, then—according to your P1—the same statement, given the same informational state, must also be true in R. Gemini artificially introduces a "context variable" that is not contained in your original premises.

The crucial question:
If simulations are truly isomorphic to reality (as assumed in P1), why should the fact that something occurs "inside a simulation" change its truth values ?

The Variable-Value Problem

The argument is: System.Origin has the value "Created by R" in S, and the value "Unknown" in R.
The objection assumes that S and R can assign different values to the same variable while still being isomorphic.

But this fundamentally contradicts the concept of a "simulation of reality."
If S is truly a simulation of R (as stated in P1), then S and R cannot systematically have different truth values for the same statements.
Otherwise, S would not be a simulation of R but something else.

Either S accurately simulates R (in which case the truth values must agree), or S has different truth values from R (in which case it is not a simulation of R).
Both cannot be true at the same time.

The "Reductio ad Absurdum"

Gemini argues that the hierarchy R → S → Sub.S shows that "being created" is relative and therefore cannot be transferred to R. But your argument does not claim that "everything is created because hierarchies exist."

Your argument is:

1. If human beings can create an accurate simulation of reality,

2. then within that simulation the statement "This world was created by an intelligent creator." is true.

3. Since the simulation is accurate, this statement must also be true in reality.

The possibility that additional sub-simulations may exist is irrelevant to this particular step.

Gemini's reductio ad absurdum turns against itself.
He presents a hierarchy R → S → Sub.S and argues that each level is created by the one above it. But this actually supports your argument.

If this logic applies to S → Sub.S, why should it not also apply to R → S ?

The questions that arise from the argument:

Q1)

Must we—or must we not—apply logic to our world under these circumstances ?

Q2)

Are there any formal objections to the argument?

a) Is it valid?
b) Is it sound?
c) Which premise do the objections target?

Q3)

Must we distinguish between categories of truth (logical / empirical / ontological) ?

If yes:

a) What criterion distinguishes these categories of truth ?
b) How does that criterion prevent the transfer of T(φ) from S to R, or vice versa ?
c) Can truths differ in their truth values ?

Q4)

Which property of φ, T, T(φ), R, or S prevents the transfer of T(φ)?

Q5)

Why would a criterion prevent the transfer of T(φ) between S and R, but not between the sub-simulations?

(In other words: Any justification for denying the transfer from S to R is arbitrary if it does not also apply to the transfer from S_1 to S_2.)

The Challenges

Any justification against the transfer between R and S is arbitrary if it does not also work for the transfer between S_1 and S_2 (sub-simulations).

The challenge, therefore, is to provide a non-arbitrary explanation for why the transfer of the truth value of φ fails.

The indirect arguments:

1)
For what rational reason should I believe in atheism if I know that all of its arguments are false in a 1:1 copy of our world ?

2)
If A(theism) and T(heism) contradict one another, and it can be shown that A is ruled out as a rational explanation while T is not, then T is the rational choice.